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Duitsland: Van democratie tot dictatuur 1918-1939

A. Beantwoord twee van onderstaande vragen:
1. How valid is the view that there was nothing more than a revolutionary situation in Germany in 1918—1919?
2. “The Treaty of Versailles lay at the root of the instability faced by the German government between 1919 and 1923.” How valid is this view?
3. To what extent does Stresemann’s foreign policy show him to be little more than a traditional German nationalist?
4. To what extent did industrialists gain most from Nazi economic policies, between 1933 and 1939?
5. How far does Nazi oppression explain the ineffectiveness of opposition to the Nazi regime, 1933—1939?

B. Beantwoord de vragen bij de bronnen

Bron A

From a newspaper article by Berlin journalist Friedrich Kroner (August 1923).
There is not much to add. Inflation pounds daily on the nerves: the insanity of the numbers, the uncertain future. There is an epidemic of fear and of naked need. Lines of shoppers form in front of shops and no disease is as contagious as this one. The lines always send the same signal: the city will be shopped empty yet again. Rice 80,000 marks yesterday costs 160,000 marks today, and tomorrow perhaps twice as much again. Everyone is buying frantically. The piece of paper, the spanking brand new banknote still moist from the printing presses, paid out today as a weekly wage shrinks in value on the way to the grocer’s shop. The zeros, the multiplying zeros . . . The rising prices bring mockery and laughter. Someone shouts, “Cheaper butter!” Instead of 1,600,000 marks just 1,400,000 marks . .

Bron B

From Franz von Papen’s Memoirs (1952).
Historical developments are the product of diverse forces . . . I am entitled to ask that my own actions be judged in the light of this fact . . . I have been represented as naïve and incapable of grasping the true implications of the political situation at the end of 1932 . . . Yet not many people seem to realise the extent to which Hitler arose because of the harsh clauses of Versailles and the economic crisis caused by reparations. Hitler and his movement were in essence a reaction against hopelessness and for that sense of hopelessness the victorious powers must bear their full share of the blame. Hitler became Chancellor with the support of almost 40% of the German electorate. I have been accused of betraying the Weimar Republic and hoisting Hitler into the saddle as a way of taking revenge against Schleicher. But the correct narrative of events shows that this is not true.

Bron C

From Ian Kershaw’s Hitler (1991)
The handover of power to Hitler on 30 January 1933 was the worst possible outcome to the irrecoverable crisis of Weimar democracy. It did not have to happen. It was at no stage a foregone conclusion. Electoral success alone could not bring it about. Under the Weimar constitution, there was no compulsion upon the President to appoint as head of government the leader of the party which had won most seats in a general election . . . Hindenburg had refused Hitler the chancellorship in August 1932 with the Nazis on the crest of a wave. Five months later he changed his mind with the Nazi Party in crisis following the electoral setback of November 1932 . . . Hitler’s appointment was technically constitutional. Few among the elite groups had Hitler down as their first choice, but by January 1933, with other options apparently exhausted, most were prepared to entertain a Hitler government. Had they opposed it, a Hitler government would have been inconceivable. Hitler needed the elites to attain power.

Bron D

From Guidelines for Teaching History in Secondary Schools (1938) issued by the German Central Institute of Education.
The teaching of History is based on the natural bond of the child with his nation and has the particular task of educating young people to respect the great German past. The teaching of History must bring the past alive for the young German in such a way that it enables him to feel the responsibility of every individual for the nation as a whole . . . A new understanding of the German past has emerged from the faith of the National Socialist Movement in the future of the German people. The teaching of History must come from this vital faith . . . The certainty of a great national existence . . . is for us based . . . at the same time on the clear recognition of the basic racial forces of the German nation, which are always active and indestructibly enduring.

Gebruik de bronnen

1. How fully does Source A explain the impact of hyperinflation on the lives of Germans in 1923? (12 punten)
2. How much do Sources B and C reveal about differing interpretations of the reasons for Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor of Germany? (16 punten)
3. Evaluate the usefulness of Source D in explaining the goal of the Nazis’ Volksgemeinschaft. (12 punten)

Bron: Geschiedenisexamen Schotland

Antwoordmodel: http://www.sqa.org.uk/files_ccc/HistorySQPAH.pdf   

 

 

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